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The  Asia  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC)  forum 
comprises  21  developed  and  developing  economies  that 
surround  the  Pacific  Rim.1  The  organization  was  created  in 
1989 and holds annual Leaders’ Meetings that bring together 
its heads of government. In this policy brief, I assess the record 
of the APEC over the 20 years of its existence and discuss the 
world environment in which APEC is likely to be operating in 
1. The 21 member economies are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam.
the next 20 years, with a particular focus on the major change in 
global institutional arrangements implied by the replacement of 
the Group of Seven/Eight (G-7/8) by the Group of Twenty (G-
20) as the chief steering committee for the world economy and, 
within that group and other international economic organiza-
tions, the increasingly central role of an informal and de facto 
Group of Two (G-2) between China and the United States.
APEC At 20
APEC has gone through three distinct periods during its two 
decades of existence:
n	 the formative years of 1989–92, initiated by Australia and 
Japan,2  with  annual  ministerial  meetings  to  chart  the 
forum’s early course; 
n	 the  dynamic  leadership  years  of  1993–97,  sponsored 
primarily by Indonesia and the United States, when the 
newly  instituted  annual  summits  set  out  the  ambitious 
Bogor Goals to achieve “free and open trade and invest-
ment in the region,” took the lead in negotiating the highly 
significant Information Technology Agreement (ITA), and 
accelerated the momentum of global trade liberalization by 
agreeing to launch a program of Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization (EVSL); and
n	 the marginalization of 1998–2008, during which the earli-
er initiatives faltered and the institution, despite its useful 
creation of extensive networks across a wide range of issues 
and its summits’ continued utility as a venue for impor-
tant bilateral meetings, failed to adopt leadership positions 
on any of the key issues facing the region and the world 
economy.
The important issue for the future is why the early dyna-
mism gave way to prolonged stagnation. The main cause was 
clearly  the  decision  of  the  key  Asian  countries  to  prioritize 
economic cooperation within East Asia itself rather than across 
2. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington: 
Institute for International Economics, 1995).
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the broader APEC construct: a focus on Pacific Asia rather than 
the Asia Pacific. This advent of a “new Asian architecture” was 
driven and reinforced by four major factors:
n  the  Asian  financial  crisis  of  1997–98,  which  gener-
ated strong and lasting distaste in Asia for the Washington 
Consensus and its institutions, especially the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), propelling in particular the Chiang 
Mai Initiative and related steps toward creating an alterna-
tive Asian Monetary Fund;
n  the absence of multilateral trade liberalization in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) after the completion of the 
Uruguay  Round  and  its  “built-in  agenda”  follow-ups, 
pointedly underlined by the failures to first launch (Seattle 
1999) and then negotiate the Doha Round; 
n  the addition of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) to the European Union so that the world’s two 
other economic poles had created their own blocs, stimulat-
ing the proliferation of ASEAN + 1 and other preferential 
agreements throughout Pacific Asia that are creating a de 
facto East Asian Free Trade Area3; and 
n  the  two  economic  bubbles  that  burst  in  the  United  States 
during the present decade, emanating from the dot.com 
sector in its early years and the financial sector at present, 
dragging down the world economy and discrediting the 
credibility and competence of the United States as both a 
model and global leader. Doubts about the United States 
increasingly extended to its performance on trade policy 
with Congress’ near rejection of liberalization initiatives 
in 2002 and 2005, abrogation of trade promotion (“fast 
track”) authority in 2007, and current failure to approve 
negotiated free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, 
Korea, and Panama.
The United States sought to counter the emerging Asia-
only focus in the region by launching FTA negotiations of its 
own with several East Asian countries (Singapore, Australia, 
Thailand, Korea, and Malaysia) and especially by proposing in 
2006 a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP)—an opera-
tional version of the original Bogor Goals. The idea attracted 
modest support from a few smaller APEC members, several 
of which tried to commence the process by setting up a P- 
(Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand), which has now 
evolved into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (with some participa-
tion from Australia, Peru, the United States itself, and Vietnam). 
3. ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
. The foreign policy of President George W. Bush, which was reviled in many 
parts of the world, may have  contributed to the declining image of the United 
States but does not appear to have had major negative repercussions in most 
of Asia.
None of the major Asian countries have joined this program, 
however, and suspicions remain that the United States is trying 
to derail Asian economic integration rather than promote a 
parallel transpacific counterpart to it. 
Hence APEC enters its third decade with strong unresolved 
tensions between its original main purpose, to “avoid drawing a 
line down the middle of the Pacific,” and the Asia-centric coopera-
tion priorities of most of its key members. Reconciliation of these 
goals is an essential prerequisite for any resumption of meaning-
ful institutional development of APEC.
thE NExt 20 YEArs
The world and the region have undergone sweeping changes 
over the past 20 years and are likely to experience even more 
far-reaching evolution over the next two decades. These shifts 
in the global and regional settings will provide the context in 
which APEC will be operating. Four stand out as likely to be 
most relevant:
n  the sharply increasing weight of Asia in the global economy 
as the developing countries, led by China, and Asia more 
broadly, already account for half of world output 5 and are 
increasing their share by 2 to 3 percentage points per year;
n  the “new mercantilism,” as more and more countries seek to 
self-insure against future crises by running large external 
surpluses in order to build even larger war chests of foreign 
exchange reserves (as well as export their way out of the 
current crisis)6; 
n  a slowing, if not a reversal, in financial globalization due to 
the responsibility of the financial sector for bringing on the 
current crisis and continuing doubts over the benefits of 
that process; and
n  further deepening of area-wide monetary and trading arrange-
ments in Asia, which will not yet be as integrated as Europe 
but will coalesce sufficiently to effectively form a third bloc 
in the world economy.
A major and highly uncertain variable will be the response 
of the global economic institutions, especially the IMF and 
the WTO, to these challenges. The Bretton Woods system is 
undergoing its first real stress test, as a result of the crisis, to see 
if it can fulfill its fundamental purpose of preventing a return to 
the world of the 1930s. Its effectiveness in promoting recovery, 
and avoiding competitive devaluations and protectionism, is yet 
5. With exchange rates calculated at purchasing power parity. The number is 
about 0 percent using market exchange rates but will also exceed 50 percent 
on that basis in less than a decade.
6. C. Fred Bergsten and Arvind Subramanian, “New Mercantilism,” Washing-
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
to be determined. The outcome will have far-reaching implica-
tions for all regional institutions, including APEC and the new 
Asia-only bodies, because failures at the global level would spur 
much greater reliance on regional regimes. 
thE AsCENt of thE G-20
One  momentous  institutional  change  is  already  clear:  the 
replacement of the G-7/8 by the G-20 as the chief steering 
committee for the world economy.7 This evolution was inevi-
table, in light of the global growth trends cited above, but has 
been sharply accelerated by the current crisis.
This development has three major implications for APEC. 
First, it greatly enhances the role of Asia in the global leadership 
structure because the G-20 includes five Asian countries, seven 
if Australia and Russia are counted, while the G-7 has only 
one. Second, the role of the United States (and, even more so, 
Europe) is diluted. No protracted negotiation over “chairs and 
shares,” as in the IMF, was required when it became essential to 
forge a global response to the first global economic crisis since 
the 1930s by including the countries that constitute the bulk of 
worldwide economic activity.
Third,  APEC  countries  account  for  half  the  member-
ship of the entire G-20. Hence the group could dominate the 
new process if it chose to act together. There could in fact be 
considerable merit in forming an “APEC caucus” within the 
G-20 to address at least some issues—e.g., Europe’s reluctance 
to reform the governance structure of the multilateral institu-
tions and India’s blockage of the Doha Round. Such a group 
would amount to the new Asia Pacific Summit, or “G-10 of 
the Asia Pacific,” that has been proposed by such Asian leaders 
as Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia and Hadi Soesastro 
from Indonesia.8
thE DE fACto G-2
Whatever happens with the current multilateral institutions and 
the larger steering committees, global leadership will increas-
ingly devolve onto the two most important countries in the 
world: China and the United States. They will shortly be the 
7. The G-7/8 has itself already come very close to replicating the G-20. Its 
latest summit in July 2009 included the “plus five” countries (Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, and South Africa) that have become regular invitees to parts 
of its meetings and, for the climate change discussion, the Major Economies 
Forum that adds all but two of the G-20. The G-20 of course treats all these 
countries on an equal footing, which the G7/8 does not, and will thus become 
the dominant venue but the membership question is clearly being resolved in 
an inclusive direction in all forums.
8. See Hadi Soesastro, “Architectural Momentum in Asia and the Pacific,” East 
Asia Forum, June 1, 2009, available at www.eastasiaforum.org. 
two largest economies and the two largest traders. They are the 
largest polluters and will determine much of the outcome on 
climate change. They lead the two groups of countries, devel-
oped and developing, that each now account for about half of 
world output. They are on opposite sides of the global imbal-
ances as the world’s largest creditor/surplus and debtor/deficit 
countries, respectively. 
Hence China and the United States bear primary responsi-
bility for the success and stability of the world economy. Only 
they have the heft and policy flexibility to exercise such responsi-
bility.9 They must of course do so informally and diplomatically, 
operating as a de facto “G-2” without ever announcing or even 
acknowledging its existence, and China has publicly enunciated 
its opposition to the concept (while obviously being attracted by 
it). Their chief goal should in fact be to make the other “Gs” and 
broader institutions work much more effectively, by reaching 
agreement between themselves before engaging the larger fora, 
thus supplementing rather than supplanting these other bodies. 
This should assuage the other major countries that might other-
wise feel slighted by such a new leadership construct.10
The G-2 could and should provide leadership for APEC as 
well. Indeed, it is perhaps clearer in the regional context than in 
any other that nothing of consequence will happen without the 
concurrence, and probably the leadership, of these two economic 
superpowers. Thus any serious planning for the future of APEC 
must focus on the views of China and the United States and the 
potential for finding agreement between them. 
oPtioNs for APEC: PACifiC AsiA AND/or AsiA 
PACifiC?
These dramatic changes in the world economy and global gover-
nance patterns will influence the policy choices of countries in 
the region but they do not alter the basic issue described at 
the outset: Do the Asian members of APEC want a primarily 
Pacific Asia future (whether constructed via a 10+3, 10+6, or 
something else) or do they want an Asia Pacific dimension as 
well? The answer to that question will go far to determine the 
architecture of the region. 
9. The European Union is the third economic superpower in today’s world but 
operates as a unit on very few issues. Hence it cannot play the central steering 
role envisaged here.
10. I first proposed a China-United States G-2 in The United States and the 
World Economy: Foreign Economic Policy for the Next Decade (Washington: 
Institute for International Economics) in late 200 and developed the idea 
more fully in 2008 in China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics) and “A Partnership of Equals: 
How Washington Should Respond to China’s Economic Challenge” in the 
July/August issue of Foreign Affairs. Such influential experts as Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Niall Ferguson have more recently proposed extending the G-2 
concept to security and overall foreign policy issues. N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 6    Ju l y   2 0 0 9

Option One: Terminate APEC. If the Asians decide that 
their futures lie in Asia-only arrangements, that their sizable 
presence in the new G-20 steering committee assures them of an 
adequately powerful seat at the global table, and that their ever-
growing economic and political weight guarantees respectful 
attention by the United States without any direct institutional 
linkages, there is a case for ending APEC. All of its original and 
continuing rationales would largely disappear in that context 
(though the Asians would obviously still have to find a way to 
manage their economic and broader relations with the United 
States). 
Option Two: Business as Usual. This “path of least resis-
tance” would acknowledge and accept APEC’s marginalization 
over the past decade but nevertheless keep it in place as an 
insurance policy against a failure of Asia’s integration efforts and 
the risk of US withdrawal from the region. Important decisions 
would be left to another day.
Option  Three:  Support  Major  Reform  of  the  Global 
Economic  Architecture.  APEC  has  paid  lip  service  to  the 
WTO and the Doha Round over the past decade but has never 
made a serious effort to actually support them. Indeed, sharp 
divisions among major APEC countries contributed mightily 
to the failure of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, the near-death 
of Doha at Cancún in 2003, and its latest setback in July 2008. 
Moreover, Asia’s distaste (or worse) for the IMF is a basic datum 
of the current milieu. 
With  APEC’s  newly  central  role  in  the  now-dominant 
G-20, however, and the systemic stress test that the crisis has 
forced onto the Bretton Woods institutions, the members (led 
informally by the G-2) might reasonably choose to explicitly 
forget about the Bogor Goals and other regional objectives in 
favor  of  trying  to  break  the  deadlocks  over  the  governance 
structure in the IMF and the Doha Round in the WTO. They 
could use their strong position in the new G-20, via an “APEC 
caucus” within that grouping, to do so. The trouble of course, 
even if APEC could really get its act together for these purposes, 
is that non-APEC countries can and might well also wield veto 
power: the Europeans in the Fund, India and Brazil in the 
WTO. Hence a sole reliance on the multilateral system, even if 
sincerely and ardently pursued, is likely to be as unproductive 
over the next decade as it has been over the past 10 years.
Option Four: Renew Aggressive Leadership of the Asia 
Pacific. This option would reconcile the “Pacific Asia versus Asia 
Pacific” debate by embracing both as parallel initiatives. The 
United States would agree to support Asian regional integra-
tion (as it has always supported European regional integration) 
as long as its components were compatible with the (perhaps 
amended) global rules. The Asians would agree to simultane-
ously  liberalize  across  the  Pacific  (as  the  Europeans  always 
supported transatlantic liberalization via the GATT/WTO to 
reduce the discriminatory impact of their increasingly preferen-
tial arrangements). The Bogor Goals/FTAAP would be updated, 
to embrace “behind the border” and “across the border” as well 
as “at the border” issues, and realistic new timetables would be 
set for concluding them.11
There are several possible techniques for achieving parallel 
progress in economic cooperation within Pacific Asia and across 
the Asia Pacific. The United States could negotiate a series of 
bilateral  FTAs  with  major  Asian  countries,  building  on  the 
Singapore and Korea pacts that have already been agreed and 
the Thailand and Malaysia talks that have begun (but are now in 
suspense). It could pursue its own “ASEAN + 1” arrangement as 
China, Japan, and Korea have already done.12 These alternatives 
are distinctly inferior to an APEC-wide initiative, however, as 
they would inevitably include numerous inconsistent and even 
conflicting provisions that would limit their practical utility, 
especially with respect to rules of origin, and leave important 
gaps in country linkages. 
The  goals  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO), one of the most successful regional institutions of all 
time, whose 60th anniversary is also being celebrated this year, 
were stated very succinctly by a prescient observer at the time of 
its creation: 	to keep the Soviet Union out,	to keep the United 
States in, and	to keep Germany down.
APEC has no external enemy like the Soviet Union, except 
perhaps for terrorism and the specter of trade and investment 
protectionism,  so  the  case  for  transpacific  cohesion  is  less 
compelling than it was for transatlantic cohesion six decades ago. 
But virtually all Asians want to keep the United States in. There 
is no other institutional economic link between Pacific Asia and 
the United States and a number of Asian countries clearly want 
to retain US engagement, including to provide a counterweight 
to the growing preponderance of China. The hedging strategies 
of  many  Asian  governments,  designed  to  provide  insurance 
against any adverse effects from China’s rising power, would be 
significantly promoted by a combination of Asia-only economic 
linkages and an ongoing Asia Pacific economic compact with 
the United States. US allies in the region, including Japan and 
Korea, would benefit greatly from a strategy that avoided their 
ever having to “choose between China and the United States.”13
11. Any FTAAP would of course have to be implemented on a preferential 
basis among its members, resolving another long-standing tension within 
APEC, as indeed the Trans-Pacific Partnership and all the East Asian regional 
agreements already are. 
12. The Obama administration has already announced that it will sign the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a prerequisite for possible participation in 
the East Asian Summit and thus closer relations with ASEAN. US participa-
tion in the East Asian Summit could of course also be part of any new Asia 
Pacific strategy.
13. I initially presented the case for “Embedding Pacific Asia in the Asia 
Pacific: The Global Impact of an East Asian Community” in a speech to the N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 6                                                                                                                   Ju l y   2 0 0 9
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China too should welcome such an outcome. Its symbiotic 
economic relationship with the United States, to which it exports 
a substantial share of its GDP and where it holds enormous 
investments, is of crucial importance to its continued economic 
success and thus its political stability. As the regional hegemon, 
it should certainly prefer having the United States “inside the 
tent”  rather  than  prowling  outside  it.  Its  systemic  interests, 
ranging from the global role of the dollar through policy coor-
dination toward North Korea, could be seriously damaged by 
excluding the United States from the Asian region. Trade and 
currency disagreements between China and the United States 
continue to smolder and launching a transpacific cooperation 
project should help contain them. Option four would appear to 
be a winning proposition for all concerned. 
Some Asian countries, including Japan, avowedly support 
both  Pacific  Asia  and  Asia  Pacific  integration  but  want  the 
former to proceed to completion before tackling the latter. Such 
sequencing would be very dangerous because it would inevita-
bly defer the transpacific dimension for a very long time and 
risk the adverse consequences of the Asia-only approach in the 
meanwhile—sizable trade and investment discrimination and 
diversion,  transpacific  disintegration  rather  than  integration, 
and the inevitable security implications thereof.
thE 2009–11 WiNDoW
Option three or, preferably, option four could be adopted and 
implemented  over  the  coming  three  years  with  Singapore, 
Japan, and the United States successively in the chair of APEC. 
Singapore has been a cardinal architect of both the 10+1 agree-
ments that are forging an East Asia Free Trade Area and contin-
ued transpacific ties. Japan, an original founder of APEC, is a 
close US ally with particular anxieties over the growing clout of 
China. The United States wants to stay engaged in the region, 
in security as well as economic terms, and can do so successfully 
if Asia agrees to avoid excessive discrimination against outsiders 
as it pursues its internal integration. 
A three-step process can be envisaged if it proves impos-
sible  to  move  directly  toward  an  FTAAP.  First,  the  United 
States and one or more major Asian countries—probably Korea 
Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on September 2, 2005. I spelled out the 
arguments for an FTAAP most comprehensively in “Toward a Free Trade Area 
of the Asia Pacific,” Policy Briefs in International Economics 07-2 (Wash-
ington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2007): the 
large welfare gains for all members from achieving free trade in the region, the 
strong push to revival of the Doha Round and multilateral liberalization that 
would inevitably result as in 1993, the consolidation of the “noodle bowl” of 
overlapping FTAs, the reinvigoration of APEC itself, the institutionalization of 
parts of the China-United States economic tension, and the overriding benefit 
of promoting transpacific integration rather than disintegration.
and Japan—should join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which 
would then comprise about half of APEC.1 This would be fully 
consistent with the “pioneer” and “21-x” strategies that APEC 
has pursued on other issues. Second, the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship  should  be  transformed  into  an  FTAAP—perhaps  with 
less comprehensive terms than the “gold standard” agreements 
championed by previous US administrations15—as soon as a 
critical mass (70 to 80 percent of the trade-weighted member-
ship, on the model of the Information Technology Agreement) 
could be engaged. Third, in a combination of options three and 
four, the new Asia Pacific grouping could then respond posi-
tively and forcefully to support revival of the Doha Round as 
will surely be demanded by non-APEC countries to counter 
such a new burst of Asia Pacific trade assimilation.16
The  Obama  administration  is  formulating  a  new  trade 
policy for the United States.17 It has already signaled a focus 
on Asia and will be looking to implement major initiatives 
when it hosts APEC’s 2011 summit (in Honolulu?), for which 
planning could begin at the Singapore summit later this year 
and continue through 2010. However, it faces strong domestic 
opposition (mainly within its own party in the Congress) to 
any new trade liberalization and needs support from its trading 
partners to get back on track. The timing offers a golden oppor-
tunity for Pacific Asia to simultaneously achieve its regional 
objectives and solidify its relationship with the United States. 
APEC could thereby restore the dynamic leadership role of its 
initial decade and immeasurably strengthen both the region and 
the world economy as it addresses the likely global evolution of 
the next 20 years.
1. The outgoing Bush administration announced its intention to join part of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The Obama administration has not 
yet made a decision on the issue but is clearly leaning in a favorable direction. 
15. As proposed by Noboru Hatakeyama in “The Creation of a Free Trade 
Area of the Asia Pacific,” a presentation to a conference sponsored by the Japan 
Economic Foundation and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, November 27, 2007.
16. The issue of expanding APEC membership, most importantly to India, 
will presumably arise during this period. It would be a huge mistake to add 
India at this time for at least three reasons: It is impossible to characterize In-
dia as a Pacific nation, its inclusion would virtually require the addition as well 
of Pakistan and Bangladesh and perhaps others (e.g., Sri Lanka and Nepal), 
and —like the European Union at every important stage of its develop-
ment—APEC should deepen its cooperation before it makes that process even 
more complicated by broadening its membership. It should be noted, however, 
that the Asia Pacific Summit and Asia Pacific G-10 ideas referenced favorably 
above would include India. 
17. C. Fred Bergsten, “Obama Needs to Be Bold on Trade,” Financial Times, 
June 2, 2009.
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